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Portland’s Fire & Police Disability & Retirement Fund

Time for Change

City Club members will vote on this report on Friday, February 3, 2006. Until the
membership vote, City Club of Portland does not have an official position on this
report. The outcome of this vote will be reported in the City Club Bulletin dated
February 17, 2006 and online at www.pdxcityclub.org.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
City Club's History with FPD&R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Financing FPD&R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Tax Reform Ballot Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Most Recent Reform Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Recent History of FPD&R and PERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FPD&R Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Assessed Value versus Real Market Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pension System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pension Funding Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FPD&R, PERS and OPSRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Pension Portability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Individual Account Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Governance (Pension System) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Disability System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
System Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Data Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Governance (Disability System) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Subrogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Other Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Systems-wide Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Political and Regulatory Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The mission of City Club is to inform its members and the community
in public matters and to arouse in them a realization of the obligations
of citizenship.
Additional copies of this report are available online at
www.pdxcityclub.org or by contacting the City Club office:
City Club of Portland
901 S.W. Washington St.
Portland, OR 97205
503-228-7231 • 503-228-8840 fax
info@pdxcityclub.org • www.pdxcityclub.org

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
COMMITTEE MEMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
APPENDIX B: WITNESS LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
APPENDIX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
APPENDIX D: CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
No. SUBSTITUTE 36287 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Portland’s Fire and Police
Disability and Retirement Fund
(FPD&R) is a combined pension
and disability system that serves
Portland's sworn fire and police
employees. The fund is governed by a board of trustees that
includes public officials, representatives from the police and
fire unions and citizen representatives.

In response to these concerns,
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Mayor Tom Potter appointed a
nine-person independent review
committee (IRC) in February
2005 to evaluate options to fully
or partially pre-fund the pension
system. In addition, City
Council charged the IRC with
examining the case management
and costs of FPD&R's disability
system. Your committee was
charged with shadowing the
IRC's work while conducting its
own research in order to comment publicly on the IRC's recommendations to City Council.

Pension System
As with previous City Club studies of the FPD&R fund, your
committee determined that the
fund's pay-as-you-go structure is
detrimental to the city's financial
health and places an unnecessarily heavy burden on property tax
payers in Portland. The FPD&R
levy has primacy over all serial
levies, as well as the city's general fund, as demonstrated by the
compression effect created by
statewide Ballot Measures 5, 47
and 50. According to Drew
Barden, the city's economist, it is
probable that at some point
FPD&R's levy will not be adequate to cover the fund's liabilities, which would have a dire
effect on the city's ability to
provide services to its citizens.
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The fund is likely the last pay-asyou-go system in the United
States. As such, current property
tax revenue, rather than investment income, is used to pay the
pension and disability benefits for
retirees and injured firefighters
and police officers. Because the
pension system is not pre-funded,
the ongoing financial viability of
the fund has been an issue of
public concern for many years.
Annual pension and disability
spending has increased from
$49.8 million to $75.4 million in
the past 10 years. The unfunded
liability of future pensions is currently $1.684 billion and will continue to grow to $8.4 billion in
about 40 years. Local media have
also raised concerns about the
high rate of disabilities in
Portland's fire and police bureaus
and loopholes that allow injured
employees to receive double compensation, which has increased
public scrutiny of the system.

FPD&R is forbidden by city charter to retain reserves greater than
$750,000. Thus, Portland's taxpayers are forced to pay every
dollar that is required by the
fund, rather than benefitting
from investment income that
pre-funding would provide. The
primary argument against prefunding the system is that it
would temporarily create a generational inequity, as one generation of taxpayers would be
forced to pay for the retirement
of those firefighters and police
officers who have already
served, as well as pre-paying for
those who are currently in service. Your committee weighed
these concerns and recommends
a gradual conversion to prefunding the system.
All city employees who are not
members of FPD&R are members
of Oregon's Public Employees
Retirement System (PERS) or the
newly revised PERS plan, the
Oregon Public Service Retirement
Plan (OPSRP). Your committee
found no compelling reason to
retain the FPD&R system beyond
retirement of current members.
Your committee recommends
that current FPD&R members
remain in the pension system
until the death of the final member and all surviving beneficiaries. Your committee also recommends placing all newly sworn
fire and police hires into
OPSRP. These recommendations
are substantially similar to those
of the IRC.

Disability System
The IRC hired a disability consulting firm, HDM Solutions, Inc.
(HDM), to compare FPD&R's
disability system with those of
comparable cities. Fire and
police disability claims in every
other city in the comparison set
were managed by their state's
workers' compensation system.
HDM also compared the cost per
claim between fire and police
disability claims in those cities
with those of their other city
employees. They were nearly
identical. In Portland, the cost
per claim within the FPD&R
system was three times higher
than the cost of workers' compensation claims for other city
employees. HDM further stated
that the city's workers' compensation approach was more in line
with industry standards than the
approach taken by FPD&R. For
these reasons, your committee
recommends moving all new
disability claims into the workers' compensation system.
Although existing claims must
continue to be addressed using
FPD&R standards, your committee found no reason to maintain
duplicate disability administrations. Therefore, your committee recommends moving the
administration of existing
FPD&R disability claims to
the city’s Office of Risk
Management, the entity that
administers the workers' compensation system. Your com-
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Administration and
Accountability

see glossary on page 28

Although significant improvements were made in 2000 when
the configuration of FPD&R's
Board of Trustees was changed
to include three citizen members,
your committee is still concerned
about accountability. Conflicts of
interest, unmet obligations and
lack of experience among the
board members are manifestations of a poorly structured
board. Until the FPD&R system
ceases to exist as a separate entity, your committee recommends
that an independent agent conduct a performance audit at regular intervals not to exceed five
years.
The long-standing nature of many
of FPD&R's problems is due, in
large part, to the fact that its
authorization rests in the city’s
charter. For good reasons, the
charter is difficult and slow to
change. However, the protective
mechanism of the charter has for
too long stood in the way of
much needed reforms at FPD&R.
The right to subrogation (the
city's ability to collect third-party
payments) is a significant example of this. Your committee
found widespread agreement
that subrogation should be part

iv

of FPD&R's disability system,
but City Council has not taken
action to bring this amendment
to citizens for a vote. The
charter is also unclear whether
FPD&R's levy is based on
assessed value or real market
value, creating even more financial uncertainty for FPD&R and
the city of Portland.
FPD&R was a system designed
to protect firefighters and police
officers at a time when disability
and retirement benefits for public employees did not exist.
These protections are now available to all city employees.
OPSRP and workers' compensation have many features and efficiencies that FPD&R is lacking
and your committee believes that
now is the time to phase out
FPD&R in a way that continues
to protect current members and
will serve future generations of
firefighters and police officers as
well as the citizens of Portland.
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Recommendations
see glossary on page 28

mittee's disability recommendations correspond with those of
the IRC.

IRC Recommendations*

Begin actuarial financing of
the FPD&R pension fund.

Your Committee's Recommendations

EE

R
AG

Existing members of FPD&R
should retain their current
pension benefits.

R
AG

Move new public safety
hires to OPSRP.

AG

EE

E
RE

New hires should be
placed into the Oregon
Public Service Retirement
Plan (OPSRP) and the
current levy should be
used to pay the Entry Age
Normal Costs on new
hires (as described by
Milliman).
Existing members should
retain their current pension benefits and remain
members of FPD&R.

The city should “pick up”
E
RE
the required 6 percent memG
SA
ber contribution to PERS
DI
[sic].

The 6 percent individual
account program cost for
new hires should be a
negotiating point between
the fire and police unions
and the city.

Move all new disability
claims for sworn public
safety officers into workers'
compensation.

All new claims by sworn
fire and police employees
should be administered
by the city's workers'
compensation system.

AG

E
RE

* The recommendations of the IRC have been paraphrased for brevity. The full text of its recommendations
is available beginning on page 24.
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IRC Recommendations*

Provide disabled public
safety officers with at
least 75 percent income
replacement.

The city's Office of Risk
Management should
administer all current
FPD&R disability claims.

The city should develop a
funding mechanism to pay
for disability claims that
includes a financial incentive to the fire and police
bureaus to return disabled
workers to the job.

Your Committee's Recommendations

T
HA
W
E
E
M RE
SO A G

E
RE
G
A

T
HA
W
E
E
M RE
SO A G

In recognition of the different risks and injuries
that fire and police personnel are subject to in
their public safety roles,
disability benefits that
address job-specific
injuries and health conditions should be added to
the city's list of standard
workers' compensation
benefits for these employees. Job-specific benefits
should be negotiated
between the city and the
unions with reference to
comparable jurisdictions.
The city of Portland's
workers' compensation
system should administer
all existing FPD&R disability claims under the
rules set forth by the
FPD&R system until such
claims are closed or otherwise resolved.

City Council should hold
the fire and police
bureaus accountable for
managing the disability
claims of their sworn
employees as they do all
other city bureaus.

IRC Recommendations*

Your Committee's Recommendations

No recommendation.

The city charter should make
explicit that the full 2.8 mills of the
FPD&R levy be assessed on real
market value.

No recommendation.

While in existence, a performance
audit of the FPD&R system should
be conducted at regular intervals
not to exceed five years. As long as
the city auditor sits on the FPD&R
Board of Trustees and supervises
the fund administrator, this audit
should be conducted by an independent agent.

No recommendation.

The city's elected officials should
vigorously engage in a privately
funded voter education campaign prior to any election in
which the conclusions and recommendations of this report,
either in whole or in part, are
included on the ballot.

No recommendation.

City Club of Portland should
take a leadership role in convening and educating community
leaders, the media, unions and
other stakeholders, and other
members of the public about the
vital importance of acting on the
conclusions and recommendations in this report.

* The recommendations of the IRC have been paraphrased for brevity. The full text of its recommendations
is available beginning on page 24.

* The recommendations of the IRC have been paraphrased for brevity. The full text of its recommendations
is available beginning on page 24.
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BACKGROUND
The Portland Fire and Police
Disability and Retirement fund
provides disability and retirement benefits to the sworn members of the fire and police
bureaus and their survivors. The
fund was established in 1948 by
adoption of chapter 5 of the city
charter. Six subsequent amendments, the most recent in
November 2000, have been
adopted. The fund is governed
by a 12-member board of
trustees, which includes the
mayor, city auditor, city treasurer, fire and police chiefs, active
members of the fire and police
bureaus, and three citizens at
large. The fund is financed
entirely by a property tax levy.
The financial viability of the
fund has been questioned by
members of City Council and
other city officials for a number
of years. Unlike Oregon's Public
Employee Retirement System
(PERS), the FPD&R pension system is not pre-funded, meaning
benefits are paid from current tax
collections rather than from
investment income. Annual pension and disability spending has
increased from $49.8 million to
$75.4 million in the past 10 years.
The unfunded liability of future
pensions is currently $1.684 billion and will continue to grow to
$8.4 billion in about 40 years.1
In addition, Portland's fire and
police bureaus experience a high-
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er rate of disabilities than other
fire and police agencies across
Oregon.2
Spearheaded by Commissioner
Dan Saltzman, in January 2005
City Council agreed upon a plan
(see Appendix D for Resolution
No. Substitute 36287) to study the
FPD&R system. The plan called
for Mayor Tom Potter to appoint
a nine-person citizen panel to
review the FPD&R system and
report to City Council by January
1, 2006. The panel was comprised
of an actuary, four human
resource specialists, a former public administrator and three members of the FPD&R Board of
Trustees, two of whom represent
the fire and police unions. The
IRC was charged with conducting
an actuarial analysis of the fund,
evaluating options for fully or
partially pre-funding the pension
system's liabilities and examining
disability costs and case management. In its authorizing resolution, City Council underscored
the need to provide an appropriate level of employee benefits for
firefighters and police officers
while being good stewards of tax
dollars. The IRC held its first
meeting on February 24, 2005.
Milliman, an actuarial and consulting firm, and HDM Solutions,
Inc. (HDM), disability consultants, were contracted by the IRC
to conduct an analysis and projection of the FPD&R pension fund
and to produce recommendations
for improvements to the FPD&R
disability program.
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City Club has studied
FPD&R and its predecessor programs 11
times since 1932,
including an in-depth
look in 1988, followed
by a charter amendment report in 1989.
These reports are
available online at
www.pdxcityclub.org.

The IRC released its report in
December 2005. City Council
held work sessions in December
2005 and January 2006. At the
time of publication of this report,
City Council is expected to place
FPD&R reform measures on the
November 2006 ballot.

City Club's History
with FPD&R
City Club has studied FPD&R
and its predecessor programs 11
times since 1932, including an
in-depth look in 1988, followed
by a charter amendment report
in 1989. These reports are available online at www.pdxcityclub.org. Most of the studies
proposed changes to benefit levels. In 1988, City Club recommended replacing FPD&R's disability program with the workers' compensation system, partially funding the pension plan
(although it specifically did not
recommend enrolling new hires
in PERS) and changing the membership of the FPD&R's Board of
Trustees to include citizen representatives. In addition, when
considering shifting FPD&R
away from being a solely pay-asyou-go system, past study committees were concerned with
generational equity for tax payers paying for FPD&R benefits.
Prompted by mounting concerns
about the financial viability of
FPD&R and its impact on other

2
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city services, City Club launched
a new study in June 2005 to
explore the issues surrounding
FPD&R, follow the work of the
IRC and analyze its outcomes.
Your committee was asked to
consider changes (or no changes)
to the FPD&R system that would
allow the city of Portland to do
the following:
1. Employ, train and retain
diverse, highly qualified people
in its fire and police bureaus;
2. Maintain a competitive, fiscally sound retirement and disability system for fire and police
employees, retirees and their
families;
3. Maintain a funding level that
pays for FPD&R obligations,
keeps Portland's tax structure
economically competitive with
other cities, and is capable of
funding other critical public
services over the coming
decades; and
4. Maintain a system that is
administered by an objective and
fiscally responsible board of
trustees.
The scope of City Club's study
was similar to that of the IRC in
that your committee evaluated
options for fully or partially prefunding the pension system;
examined disability costs and
financial implications of current
case management practices; and
considered the financial implica-

tions of FPD&R funding on other
city services. City Club's study
committee was asked to recommend support for or rejection of
the proposed actions that come
before City Council, with the
option of offering recommendations of its own.
To that end, your committee of
11 City Club members, all
screened for conflict of interest,
met regularly between June 14
and January 9, 2006, attended
meetings of the IRC, FPD&R
Board of Trustees and City
Council. Your committee read
and analyzed numerous reports,
articles and other materials, and
interviewed witnesses with
expertise in finance, economics,
pension and disability plans, as
well as stakeholders of the fund.
Since the last City Club analysis
of FPD&R in 1988, much has
changed in both the structure of
the fund and the tax system that
finances it. In 1989, chapter 5 of
the city charter was amended to
adjust retirement and disability
benefits and the size of the board
was increased to allow for citizen
representation. This same charter
amendment eliminated employee contributions to the plan.
These charter changes were, in
part, a response to a 1971 state
requirement (ORS 237.620 (4))
that, in order to be exempt from
Public Employee Retirement
System, public employers in
Oregon must offer their employees benefits that are “equal to or
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see glossary on page 28

better than” PERS. Since 2003,
the equal-to-or-better-than test
must be satisfied every two
years.3

Financing FPD&R
FPD&R is a defined-benefit, payas-you-go system that is funded
through a millage levy. In general, millage levies are no longer
allowed in Oregon; however, the
FPD&R levy was exempted by
legislation in 1991.* By city charter, the levy is restricted at $2.80
per $1,000 of assessed value.
Expenses that exceed that limit
are the responsibility of the city's
general fund.

see glossary on page 28

Tax Reform Ballot
Measures
In 1990, Oregonians passed
Ballot Measure 5, which limited
property taxes for local governments to $10 per $1,000 of
assessed value. Under Measure
5, when local tax levies exceed
the $10 limit, all affected levies
are reduced on an aggregate
level to bring the total tax collected within the $10 limit. This
effect is known as compression.4

* In 1991, the Legislature determined that the
electorate did not intend for levies to be raised or
lowered by changing the assessment ratio of their
properties. Subsection 4 of ORS 310.125 reads,
“This section does not apply to levies which were
approved for the purpose of financing a fire and
police disability and retirement fund.”

4

In 1996 Oregon voters passed
Ballot Measure 47, which defined
the assessed value of a property
as 90 percent of the real market
value of the 1995-96 tax year or
the assessed value of the 1994-95
tax year, whichever was lower,
and capped future increases at 3
percent per year.5 Measure 47
proved difficult for tax assessors
to implement, so the Legislature
rewrote Measure 47 and sent the
revisions to voters as Measure
50, which passed in 1997.
Measure 50 changed the calculation of compression, which had
been determined on an aggregate
level, to a property-by-property
basis. This change made accurate
projections of tax revenue virtually impossible.6

Most Recent
Reform Efforts
In 1998, City Council considered
a charter amendment for the
November 1998 ballot, but the
issue was withdrawn pending
further study.7 In 1999, City
Council created an independent
committee to recommend charter
changes that were ultimately
passed by the voters in 2000.8
These charter amendments
changed the membership of the
FPD&R Board of Trustees from
three police representatives,
three fire representatives, the fire
and police chiefs, the mayor, the
city auditor and the city treasurer to its current configuration of

Portland’s Fire & Police Disability & Retirement Fund: Time for Change

two police representatives, two
fire representatives, three citizen
members, a joint seat held by the
chiefs of fire and police, the
mayor, the city auditor and the
city treasurer. (See below.) This
charter change also prohibited
the payment of disability compensation to incarcerated members.

Recent History of
FPD&R and PERS
In response to a funding crisis of
its own, PERS was reformed in
2003, and new members are now
enrolled in a revised plan known
as the Oregon Public Service
Retirement Plan (OPSRP). The
state's equal-to-or-better-than
test now applies to OPSRP rather
than PERS. As of January 1,

FPD&R Board Composition
Prior to Charter Changes in
2000 (9 Votes)

After Charter Changes in
2000 (11 Votes)

Mayor

Mayor

City auditor

City auditor

City treasurer

City treasurer

3 fire representatives

2 fire representatives

3 police representatives

2 police representatives
3 at-large citizens (1 selected
by the fire and police unions,
1 selected by the mayor and
1 selected by the board)
Joint seat (1 vote) shared by
fire and police chiefs
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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
FPD&R Levy

see glossary on page 28

2005, FPD&R was valued at 274
percent of OPSRP.9 In other
words, as a result of the creation
of OPSRP, FPD&R now provides
significantly greater benefits
than legally required by statute.
Again using the equal-to-or-better-than test, FPD&R benefits are
also more generous than all
other public employee pension
plans that are exempt from
OPSRP.

As such, the FPD&R levy could
theoretically compress all local
serial levies down to zero dollars.
While this is not likely, the estimated compression rate in fiscal
year 2004-05 was 30 percent.
This means that the Multnomah
County Library levy ($0.75 per
$1000), the city of Portland Parks
and Recreation levy ($0.39 per
$1000) and Portland's Children's
Investment Fund levy ($0.40 per
$1000) are currently receiving
only 70 percent of their projected
— and voter-approved — revenue, in part because the FPD&R
levy ($2.80 per $1000) has prima* Serial levies have a fixed tax rate per $1,000 that
is established prior to the authorization of the
levy. Floating levies' tax rates are determined
annually. In the case of FPD&R, the board of
trustees provides City Council with the amount
of the annual liability of the system and City
Council authorizes the FPD&R levy at a rate that
will fund that liability.

6
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Assessed Value versus
Real Market Value
Ballot Measures 47 and 50
together require that tax assessors calculate both the assessed
value and the real market value
of every property in Portland,
charging the property owner the
lesser of the two amounts.12
These two methods of valuation
create further doubt about the
viability of the current pay-asyou-go system because the city
charter is ambiguous as to
whether the $2.80 per $1000 limit
is based on the assessed value or
real market value of the property.
Chapter 5-103(b) of the city charter states:
The Council shall levy each
year, at the same time and in the
same manner that other taxes
are levied, a tax upon all taxable
property within the City of
Portland not exempt from taxation, not to exceed two and onehalf (2-1/2) mills on each dollar
valuation, sufficient to produce
and provide a sum equal to said
required amounts so prepared
and transmitted by the Board.

Portland’s Fire & Police Disability & Retirement Fund: Time for Change
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Portland is likely the only major
city in the United States to operate a pay-as-you-go pension system.10 The FPD&R levy is one of
Portland's two floating levies
(the other being urban renewal
levies) that have priority over
local option serial levies.* The
city charter gives the FPD&R
levy primacy over other levies
because the payment of pension
benefits is a contractual obligation as opposed to service provisions that are not contractual.

cy.11 Additionally, to compensate
for properties that have reached
the $10 per $1000 limit established
by Measure 50, FPD&R must set
its levy at a rate that disproportionately affects properties that
have not reached the $10 per
$1000 limit in order to generate
the necessary tax revenue to cover
its annual projected liabilities.

At the same time other levies
of taxes are made and in addition to tax levies authorized by
the Charter or other authorizations by the voters, the Council
shall levy each year a special tax
of three-tenths of a mill on each
dollar of the assessed valuation
of the property in the City of
Portland not exempt from taxation, which shall be credited
each year to the Fire and Police
Disability and Retirement Fund
provided for by Section 5-101 of
the Charter and said special tax
of three-tenths of a mill shall be
in addition to all other taxes
which may be levied according
to law.

Prior to the passage of Measure
50, property taxes in Oregon were
assessed on either assessed value
or real market value. Measure 50
muddied the waters by having
taxpayers pay the lower of the
two assessments. The charter language is not explicit on this issue
and refers only to the levy being
assessed “…at the same time and in
the same manner that other taxes are
levied.…” If the levy is based on
the real market value, the margin
before which the levy reaches its
maximum and the city's general
fund must be tapped to cover
FPD&R costs is reasonably sufficient. However, there is an
impending danger if the levy is
based on the assessed value,
because those values were
capped in the 1997-98 tax year
and their rate of growth is limited
to 3 percent per year under the
terms of Measure 50.
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Historically, real market value has
increased at a rate greater than 3
percent, leading to a sizeable difference between the two. In fiscal
year 2004-05 the levy rate was
$1.46 per $1,000 of real market
value and $2.25 per $1,000 of
assessed value.13 There is a real
possibility that the fund’s liability
would meet or exceed the levy's
cap if the city must rely on
assessed valuations. That scenario
would have dire effects on the
city's ability to provide basic services because the general fund
would be responsible for any liabilities that the levy could not
cover. In theory, the city's ability
to provide fire and police protection (not to mention water, street
maintenance and other city services) would be compromised
because the general fund would
be paying the pensions of retired
sworn fire and police employees,
rather than paying current
employees. In addition, Portland
would likely lose its AAA bond
rating. According to the city's
Office of Management and
Finance staff, the working
assumption is that the FPD&R
levy is based on real market value;
however, this assumption has not
been tested in a court of law.

Pension System
Pension Funding Options
One obvious solution to the
uncertainty of a pay-as-you-go
system is to pre-fund the system.
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This is not a new idea and several
proposals ranging from partial to
full funding have been suggested
as part of this and previous
reviews. The arguments against
pre-funding the system are generally based on issues of generational equity — the generation of
taxpayers that bears the burden of
funding the system would be
forced to pay for both the retirements of the generation of sworn
public safety employees who
came before them, as well as the
pensions of those who are currently serving them. A counter
argument is that the sooner the
system is funded, the sooner taxpayers can benefit from the fund's
ability to earn investment income.
see glossary on page 28

Chapter 7-110 (5) adds:

Milliman, the actuarial firm
hired by the IRC, recommended
that the levy pay the normal cost
of new hires going into OPSRP
using the entry age actuarial cost
method. The entry age actuarial
cost method is a standard
method for actuarial funding.
Normal costs are based on the
assumption that a portion of an
employee's salary is invested,
and that amount plus investment
returns would cover the cost of
that employee's retirement benefit. The entry age actuarial cost
method simply converts normal
costs into a percentage of an
individual's salary at entry into
the system.

The arguments
against pre-funding
the system are generally based on issues
of generational equity
the generation of
taxpayers that bears
the burden of funding
the system would be
forced to pay for both
the retirements of the
generation of sworn
public safety employees who came before
them, as well as the
pensions of those who
are currently serving
them.

FPD&R could be pre-funded in
part or in whole by selling pension obligation bonds. In theory,
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Although it is unlikely, given current market projections, that the
levy would exceed its $2.80 limit
if the system were to be fully
funded through a combination of
paying normal costs on new hires
and paying the remainder
through pension bonds, it is possible.14 If normal costs were paid
on new hires only, and the liability on current FPD&R members
continued to accrue on a pay-asyou-go basis, the risk would be
reduced (because there would be
no arbitrage) and the levy would
stay within its $2.80 limits
whether the investments of the
normal fund contributions earned
8 percent (as the Oregon
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Investment Council has historically exceeded on PERS investments) or a more conservative
5.25 percent.15
While acknowledging the advantages of pre-funding the system,
there are several reasons FPD&R
trustees should not assume
responsibility for investing the
funds. The first is to ensure a firewall between the city's other
resources and the fund. Secondly,
FPD&R's trustees are not investment professionals and should
not be given responsibility for
those assets, especially given current concerns about conflict of
interest.* Thirdly, the city does
not have the authority to invest in
equities, so they would need
authorization from the
Legislature to do so. Instead the
city could give the Oregon
Investment Council, which is an
independent investing body with
a proven track record of performance that exceeds the market, the
responsibility to manage the
fund. Authorization from the
Legislature would be necessary
for the Oregon Investment
Council to invest money on
behalf of FPD&R.

FPD&R, PERS and OPSRP
The FPD&R pension system is a
defined-benefit system that, by
its very nature, places the risk on
the payer, in this case, property
taxpayers in Portland. PERS,
also a defined-benefit system,
* For further discussion of governance and
accountability, see pages 16 and 17.
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revenue from the bonds would be
invested so that the difference
between the investment earnings
would be greater than the interest
paid to bondholders. This
process, known as arbitrage, is
widely used to fund pension systems. The risk inherent in this
proposition is that the financial
market could take a downturn to
such an extent that investment
income would be insufficient to
cover costs. In a worst case scenario, the general fund would
need to cover both the pension
requirements and the debt service. However, pension obligation
bonds would not exacerbate the
effect of compression on tax levies
because general obligation bonds
are outside the $10 per $1000 limitation established by Measures 5
and later affected by Measures 47
and 50.

suffered (until 2004) from projections that were based on outdated actuarial lifespan models and
an unsustainable minimum rate
of return of 8 percent. These projections underestimated the number of years that pension benefits
would be payable and overestimated the investment earnings
available to pay those benefits.
OPSRP is a hybrid plan that combines a defined-benefit plan with
a defined-contribution plan,
thereby sharing the risk between
employers and employees. In
addition, the guaranteed rate of
return is limited and the actuarial
tables have been updated.
According to Milliman, OPSRP
had the highest replacement
ratio of a peer group of nine
retirement plans. OPSRP members generally are enrolled in
Social Security, whereas FPD&R
members, by their choice, are
not. Even when Social Security
was removed from the calculation, OPSRP continued to have a
higher replacement ratio than
FPD&R due to projected earnings from the Individual Account
Program (IAP).*16
FPD&R members do not currently contribute to Social Security,

though, as a group, they may
choose to do so at any time with
a formal request from their full
membership to City Council.
Most OPSRP members do contribute to Social Security.
FPD&R's benefit package was
designed, in part, to provide benefits (e.g., long-term disability
benefits) that do not exist in all
other pension systems, including
OPSRP, because they are provided by Social Security. In some
cases, these benefits are offset
when benefits are provided
through workers' compensation
available through other insurers,
and could be purchased by the
Portland Firefighters Association
and Portland Police Association.17

Pension Portability
Portland's firefighters and police
officers are among the very few
public employees in Oregon who
are not members of PERS or
OPSRP. This makes it difficult
for Portland firefighters and
police officers to move to other
jurisdictions, and for outside
public safety officers to come to
Portland. Partial pensions on
multiple pension systems (e.g., a
partial career under FPD&R and
a partial career under PERS or
OPSRP) generally provide a

* The OPSRP Individual Account Program (IAP) is comprised of any employee contributions into the
OPSRP system, including the 6 percent of salary required by ORS.200(1)(a). “An active member of the
Public Employees Retirement System shall contribute to the Public Employees Retirement Fund and there
shall be withheld from salary of the member 6 percent of that salary as an employee contribution.”
According to the January 2005 revision of “The PERS Chapter 238 Program: Your Member's Handbook: A
Guide to PERS Chapter 238 and OPSRP Individual Account Program Benefits And Services 2003-2005,”
IAP contributions, depending on the arrangements made between employers and employees, may come
from members either as a pre-tax or an after-tax contribution or paid by employers and sent on behalf of
members.
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lower combined retirement
income than a single pension
system. Whether this has measurable implications for recruitment and retention is unclear to
your committee.

Individual Account Program
According to an actuarial analyst
from PERS,18 71 percent of public
employers, on behalf of nearly 75
percent of active public employees in the PERS/OPSRP system,
pay their employees' 6 percent
IAP contribution. This employer
pick up was often negotiated in
exchange for lower or no wage
increases because these contributions come from pre-tax dollars
and are not subject to payroll
taxes. Because Portland firefighters and police officers are
not members of the PERS/
OPSRP system, the city and the
fire and police unions have never
negotiated the 6 percent employee contribution. A decision by
City Council to grant the 6 percent contribution outside the collective bargaining process hobbles both parties' ability to
engage in the give and take that
defines labor negotiations.

Governance (Pension System)
Although the vast majority of the
FPD&R's unfunded liability is
the pension system, it requires
very little of the trustees' time.
David Thurman, city treasurer,
theorized that the reason the
treasurer, auditor and mayor
were placed on the board in 1948
was to provide oversight and
12

accountability for the pension
system and not to adjudicate disability claims. As immediate full
funding is not a viable option, it
is likely that there will remain an
unfunded pension liability until
the last of the current FPD&R
pension members dies. It therefore stands to reason that there
will be a role for an elected official to provide oversight and
ensure accountability on the
FPD&R Board until the unfunded liability is retired.

Disability System
System Accountability
The FPD&R disability system is
fraught with accountability problems. Among them are the
financial disconnect between the
fire and police bureaus and the
disability fund itself; an inadequate system for tracking disability-related data; the decisionmaking process for disability
claims; and the composition of
the FPD&R Board of Trustees.
Portland's fire and police
bureaus have little to no financial
incentive to bring their injured
employees back to work quickly
because currently, once a firefighter or police officer is injured,
that individual comes off the
bureau's payroll and onto
FPD&R's disability system. The
current return-to-work structure
further complicates the issue. In
1997, the administrative func-
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tions in the police force were
converted to civilian positions
and, when disabled police officers filled these administrative
slots as limited-duty positions,
an employee sued the city over
issues of equal pay for equal
work. FPD&R and the fire and
police bureaus have since negotiated a limited number (five firefighters and three police officers)
of limited-duty positions for
which the bureaus are reimbursed by FPD&R for a percentage of the salary of injured
employees. These positions do
not address the full extent of the
need, and in the case of the
police bureau, they are only
available to those with temporary disabilities.
Employees also have a financial
incentive to stay on disability
under the current FPD&R system because medical coverage
for their injuries ends when they
return to work. So even if the
employee is capable of limitedduty work, if the injury is longlasting, it may remain in the
employee’s financial best interest
not to return to work. In contrast, workers' compensation
facilitates injured employees
returning to work as soon as
possible and continues to cover
all medical costs associated with
the injury for the remainder of
that person's life. The approach
taken by workers' compensation
is consistent with the best practices of the industry, which have
demonstrated that it is signifi-

The FPD&R disability
system is fraught with
accountability problems. Among them
are the financial disconnect between the
fire and police
bureaus and the
disability fund itself;
an inadequate system
for tracking disabilityrelated data; the decision-making process
for disability claims;
and the composition
of the FPD&R Board
of Trustees.
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cantly better for the physical and
mental health of the injured
party to return to work as soon
as possible, even if only in a limited-duty position.19
Representatives of the Portland
Firefighters Association and the
Portland Police Association told
your committee they are concerned that moving new disability claims into workers' compensation will increase the number
of claims rejected. HDM, the disability consulting firm hired by
the IRC, found that the city's
workers' compensation rejection
rates were within industry
norms (and the norms referenced
included firefighters and police
officers covered by workers'
compensation). Unfortunately,
FPD&R does not collect data on
the percentage of claims rejected
so no direct comparison was possible.
In HDM's report to the IRC, all
of the firefighters and police officers in comparable cities were
covered by workers' compensation.* The majority of those
cities included supplemental
coverage, either through their
unions or through workers' compensation, to specifically address
the types of injuries to which
firefighters and police officers
are subjected. Although firefighting and police work are
* Comparable cities used were Cleveland;
Denver; Fort Worth, Texas; Long Beach,
California; Milwaukee; Oakland, California;
Oklahoma City; Sacramento, California; Seattle
and Tacoma, Washington.
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inherently dangerous, in comparable cities, the cost per claim
was nearly identical between
general city employees and firefighters and police officers.
Portland was the sole exception
with FPD&R costs being more
than three times higher than
those managed by the city's
workers' compensation system.
FPD&R trustees, FPD&R members and others expressed concern to your committee that the
unique disabilities common
among firefighters and police
officers must be acknowledged.
They believe it is beneficial to
both claimants and the disability
system to have decision-makers
with personal knowledge and
experience of the types of situations and risk factors that active
firefighters and police officers
face adjudicating disability
claims. These witnesses stated
that one of the unique benefits
of FPD&R was having this
expertise on the board, and they
were concerned that this advantage would be lost if new claims
were managed by workers'
compensation.
The HDM report also raised
questions about whether new
employees or new claims should
be moved into workers' compensation. The city attorney's office
believes the contract for disability services comes into effect
when a claim is made, not upon
hiring. HDM reported that the
most expeditious way to capture
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savings in the provision of disability benefits is to have all new
claims be under workers' compensation.20 If all new claims are
to be placed under the jurisdiction of workers' compensation, it
would become increasingly costly to maintain two disability
administrations. HDM, as well
as the city's workers' compensation manager, concluded that
additional cost savings could be
captured by moving the administration of existing FPD&R disability claims into the city's
Office of Risk Management,
where the city's workers' compensation program is administered, while still retaining the
FPD&R benefit package.

HDM estimated that
the city would realize
savings of $2.7 million
per year if all new
claims were to be
administered by workers' compensation.

HDM estimated that the city
would realize savings of $2.7
million per year if all new claims
were to be administered by
workers' compensation. HDM
based their savings estimates on
their ability to find a private
contractor that could administer
FPD&R disability claims for
$300,000 a year, a claim that they
substantiated. Although the IRC
tried to fine-tune this estimate,
the effort proved to be too complex for the IRC to resolve in the
time available.
IRC members Bob Lemon and
Leo Painton, both of whom are
also FPD&R trustees and members of the fire and police unions
respectively, took issue with
HDM’s estimates and wrote
minority reports critical of the
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savings projection. While your
committee agrees that some conclusions in the HDM report are
unsubstantiated, we nevertheless
believe that moving sworn fire
and police disability claims into
workers' compensation will
result in a net savings for the city.

pensation claims examiner certification (new hires have 12
months to become certified). Yet
FPD&R staff have no decisionmaking authority; they can only
make recommendations to the
FPD&R board.

ficiaries of FPD&R, leaving their
impartiality in question. Your
committee also questions the
inclusion of the city auditor and
treasurer on the board since they
have no expertise in disability
claims management, and seem to
continue on the board primarily
as a relic of the city's charter.
Your committee doubts the city
auditor, city treasurer and mayor
should be spending their time
adjudicating disability claims.

Governance (Disability System)
FPD&R has an antiquated data
tracking system that makes
reporting and analysis difficult.
HDM found that much of the
critical data is buried in text
fields that required manual
searches; the data collected are
not comparable to the workers'
compensation data (despite
efforts to move the FPD&R system into closer compliance with
workers' compensation); and that
some key data points are not collected. Particularly significant to
your committee, FPD&R does not
track the number of staff recommendations that are either
upheld or overturned by the
FPD&R Board of Trustees.
Without this information, it is difficult for City Council and other
independent bodies, such as the
IRC and your committee, to identify trends and irregularities in
disability case management.

In 2000, the FPD&R Board of
Trustees was reconfigured to
address concerns about over-representation of FPD&R members
on the board. The number of fire
and police union members was
reduced and three citizen members were added.
However, concerns persist, even
among trustees, about the conflict of interest inherent in having
FPD&R beneficiaries serving on
a board that both defines policy
and adjudicates disability claims.
A subcommittee of the board of
trustees, known as the
Expediting Committee, adjudicates approximately 90 percent
of the claims.* The Expediting
Committee is comprised of two
fire and two police representatives and the city auditor and
treasurer on a rotating basis,
meaning four-fifths of the
Expediting Committee are bene-

Decision-making
Under the leadership of Babette
Heeftle, FPD&R has made significant improvements in the way
disability claims are managed.
In 2005, Heeftle began requiring
disability claims management
staff have Oregon workers' com16

* The Expediting Committee is a subcommittee of
the FPD&R Board of Trustees that adjudicates all
routine FPD&R disability claims. The most challenging claims are reviewed by the full board and
any member can appeal the decision of the expediting committee to the full board. The members
of the Expediting Committee are the four elected
fire and police representatives as well as either
the treasurer or auditor on a rotating basis.
FPD&R Administrative Rule II. D.a
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Subrogation
see glossary on page 28

Data Management

The FPD&R system is governed
by chapter 5 of the city charter,
and is limited to legal interpretation of the language for any issue
not explicitly addressed in the
charter. Subrogation is not mentioned in chapter 5, but according to Ken McGair, a deputy city
attorney, subrogation of wages
paid to injured employees who
are not able to work is a contractual right. The charter's silence
on subrogation prohibits FPD&R
from collecting third-party insurance claims on medical payments. Firefighters and police
officers may voluntarily turn
over an insurance settlement, but
they rarely do. A charter amendment that addresses the right to
subrogation has been drafted
and agreed upon by all parties
involved, but City Council has
yet to bring the new charter language before voters.

Other Concerns
Many improvements have been
made in the way FPD&R manages disability claims in the 11
years since its last performance
audit. (FPD&R's finances are
audited annually.) These
improvements include switching
from a staff physician to relying
on a preferred provider system
for certifying injuries and
improving the quality of the documentation presented by staff to
the Expediting Committee. Many
of these improvements were
made with the explicit intent to
bring FPD&R in compliance with
workers' compensation standards. While these improvements were commendable efforts
on the part of FPD&R staff and
trustees, they have not all been
codified in administrative rules.
Thus, there is no guarantee that
the recent improvements will be
sustained over time.

Systems-wide
Accountability
Your committee found a great
need for regular performance
audits of the FPD&R system, the
most recent being in 1994. And
while two elected city officials —
the mayor and the city auditor
— serve on FPD&R’s Board of
Trustees, the routine duties
assigned to them by charter and
administrative rules detract from
their ability to oversee the city's
single largest liability. Rather
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than adjudicating disability
claims, which they are currently
required to do, their attention
should be focused on providing
public oversight and reforming
the disability and pension systems. Since the auditor supervises the FPD&R administrator and
is a member of the board, there is
a conflict of interest in having
him audit FPD&R. This conflict
must be addressed in order to
improve the accountability of
FPD&R.
FPD&R has used the same actuarial firm, EFI, to conduct its
actuarial audit for the past two
decades. PERS changes its auditor every five years. Your committee found no indication of
suspect activity. In fact, using a
different industry-approved
standard than EFI, Milliman
authenticated EFI's data as part
of the IRC’s analysis. In this
case, Milliman's independent
audit validated the longtime
work of EFI; however, without
periodic validation, problems
could remain hidden.

Political and
Regulatory Challenges
This is not the first time a group
has been appointed by City
Council or the mayor to study
FPD&R's pension and disability
systems. Many of these efforts
appear to have fallen victim to
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the forces of politics or have
failed due to insufficient funding
for a public education campaign.
Amendments to the city charter
and measures that raise taxes
require voter approval, and
many of the recommendations
contained in the IRC's report, as
well as in this report, are of these
two types. These are complicated
issues and a well-funded campaign will be necessary to educate the voters about the issues
involved.

police union is ready to be a
partner in change. He understands that the options available
for change are not win-lose;
rather, they require balancing
short- and long-term risks and
benefits to all of Portland's
employees and citizens.
Your committee's conclusions
and recommendations follow.

Robert King, president
of the police union,
acknowledged problems with FPD&R's
pay-as-you-go system
and told your committee that the police
union is ready to be
a partner in change.

Making changes to the FPD&R
system is slow and cumbersome.
This difficulty offers some protection by limiting the ability to
make frequent changes, but it
also hampers FPD&R's ability to
keep up with changing trends
and emerging issues. Workers'
compensation is based on statutory law, which is easier to
change.
Personal financial security when
disabled and during retirement
are justifiably important and
emotional issues for firefighters
and police officers, and for that
reason, the cooperation of the
Portland Firefighters Association
and the Portland Police
Association will be an important
element in a successful campaign
for change. Robert King, president of the police union,
acknowledged problems with
FPD&R's pay-as-you-go system
and told your committee the
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CONCLUSIONS
Funding
1. FPD&R is overly reliant on property tax revenue and is reaching a
critical threshold where real market value must continue to increase at
an unsustainable rate in order to generate sufficient tax revenue to
match projected liabilities.
2. FPD&Rs pay-as you-go pension system is not sensible because it
cannot yield investment income to offset the cost of pension benefits.

8. Your committee found no reasonable justification for maintaining
the FPD&R pension system when nearly every other public employee
in Oregon is a member of the PERS/OPSRP system.
9. Fully or partially pre-funding the pension system, while temporarily
placing an additional burden on current taxpayers, is necessary to protect the city's long-term financial well-being.
10. The city, the Portland Firefighters Association and the Portland
Police Association should have the same opportunity to engage in
negotiations regarding the 6 percent employee contribution as the
city has with other unions whose members are enrolled in the
PERS/OPSRP system.

City's Financial Health
3. FPD&R is a significant financial liability and the longer the pay-asyou-go system remains in place, the greater the risk to the city's ability
to provide services to its citizens, maintain its AAA bond rating and
collect projected revenues from serial levies.
4. Tax compression, exacerbated by the primacy of FPD&R's levy over
serial levies, jeopardizes other basic public services by tapping the
city’s general fund.
5. To compensate for properties that have reached the $10 per $1000
limit established by Measure 50, FPD&R must set its levy at a rate that
disproportionately affects properties that have not reached the $10 per
$1000 limit in order to generate the necessary tax revenue to cover its
annual projected liabilities.

Disability System
11. It is necessary and appropriate to provide disability benefits that
meet the needs of firefighters and police officers, who work in inherently dangerous occupations. This need must be balanced with the
city's obligation to provide services for the public at-large and the duty
of elected officials and public employees to be good stewards of public
money.
12. Your committee found no compelling reason to maintain a unique
disability system for firefighters and police officers given that FPD&R’s
cost per claim is three times higher than the city’s workers' compensation system.

Pension System

13. FPD&R's inability to collect subrogation payments places an unnecessary burden on Portland's taxpayers. It is indefensible that City
Council has not taken action to rectify this technicality. In contrast,
workers' compensation has the right to subrogation.

6. The FPD&R system is an historic artifact that has outlived its purpose.
There is no rational basis for continuing the FPD&R pension system
after the death of all current members and their surviving beneficiaries.

Administration

7. Enrolling new hires into OPSRP would be beneficial to future sworn
fire and police employees and taxpayers because the replacement ratio
is higher in OPSRP, the pension is portable, and financing would be
more stable once the system is fully funded.

14. FPD&R staff are hampered by working within an ineffective organizational structure that relies on an outmoded data system.
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15. The FPD&R fund administrator and other staff have improved the
quality of disability case management, but these changes have not been
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codified, nor are they sufficient to justify the continued operation of the
FPD&R system.

17. FPD&R's practice of using the same actuarial firm year after year is
inconsistent with sound pension management practices.

Governance
16. As a result of structural changes made in 2000, the composition of the
FPD&R Board of Trustees is less susceptible to conflicts of interest.
However, the current structure of the board fails to address a number of
concerns:
A. It is inappropriate that five of the 11 votes on the board of
trustees, which has final decision-making authority on many issues
including disability claims, are held by active members of the fire
and police bureaus, and a sixth seat is held by an at-large member
chosen by the fire and police bureau representatives.
B. Concerns of conflict of interest are further aggravated because the
vast majority of disability claims are adjudicated by a committee in
which four-fifths of the members are beneficiaries of the system.
C. The city auditor has an inherent conflict of interest serving as both
supervisor of the fund administrator and as the city's chief accountability officer.
D. It is unreasonable today for the city auditor and mayor to be
responsible for adjudicating individual disability claims. As elected
officials, their time and attention should be focused on ensuring wise
use of public resources and general accountability of the system.
E. Public interest is served by having at least one elected official
serving on the FPD&R board as long as the fund continues to provide pension benefits.
F. The city charter is flawed in that it gives final decision-making
authority on disability claims to FPD&R trustees, but it does not provide that they have any experience in disability claims management.
In contrast, workers' compensation officials must have state certification in claims management.
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Accountability
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18. FPD&R's data systems do not efficiently or effectively record or report
information required to measure key outcomes.
19. The fire and police bureaus should be held accountable for managing
the number and cost of disability claims of their sworn employees as are
other city bureaus.

Political Issues
20. Previous efforts to significantly reform FPD&R have generally been
ineffectual because the issues are complex and politically sensitive. In
addition, solutions involve charter changes and require a significant voter
education campaign to build a constituency for change.
21. Fire and police unions have a responsibility to advocate for and negotiate the best possible benefit packages for their members. Efforts to
change benefits, even when the city's financial health is in danger, might
well be met with understandable resistance by the unions.
22. The array of charter changes necessary to fully address the problems
that your committee and the IRC have identified will require a voter-education campaign. While fire and police unions have a built-in voter constituency and the financial resources to mount a well-funded campaign,
the city of Portland is legally prohibited from using public resources in
support of ballot measures, even when referred to voters by City Council.

Charter Clarity
23. The lack of clarity in the city's charter regarding whether the millage
limits are based on assessed value or real market value has potentially
dire implications for the financial health of the city.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Your Committee Recommends:
4. The city of Portland's workers' compensation system should administer all existing FPD&R disability claims under the rules set forth by
the FPD&R system until such claims are closed or otherwise resolved.

Pension
Independent Review Committee Recommendations:
• Accept the recommendation of Milliman to begin actuarial financing of
pensions for all future sworn officers to slowly reduce and finally pay off
the $1.684 billion unfunded actuarial liability the fund has accumulated.
• Existing members of the system will retain their plan and pension
benefits, but no new members will join the FPD&R system after an
effective date.
• On the effective date, newly hired public safety personnel will be
placed in PERS/OPSRP rather than FPD&R. The City should “pick up”
the required 6% member contribution to PERS [sic].

Your Committee Recommends:
1. New hires should be placed into the Oregon Public Service
Retirement Plan (OPSRP) and the current levy should be used to pay
the Entry Age Normal Costs on new hires (as described by Milliman).
2. Existing members should retain their current pension benefits and
remain members of FPD&R.
3. The 6 percent individual account program cost for new hires should
be a negotiating point between the fire and police unions and the city.

5. All new claims by sworn fire and police employees should be under
the jurisdiction of the city's workers' compensation system.
6. In recognition of the different risks and injuries that fire and police
personnel are subject to in their public safety roles, disability benefits
that address job-specific injuries and health conditions should be
added to the city's list of standard workers' compensation benefits for
these employees. Job-specific benefits should be negotiated between
the city and the unions with reference to comparable jurisdictions.
7. City Council should hold the fire and police bureaus accountable for
managing the disability claims of their sworn employees as the City
Council does for all other city bureaus.

Charter
8. The city charter should make explicit that the full 2.8 mills of the
FPD&R levy be assessed on real market value.

Accountability
Disability
Independent Review Committee Recommendations:
All new Disability claims for Portland public safety officers as of the
effective date (either through City Council /member action or Charter
change) should be processed by the Workers' Compensation system as
administered by the City, and that public safety officers be provided
additional benefit: A minimum income replacement of 75% as
described in the HDM report. Further a majority of the Committee recommended moving the administration and management of open disability claims for current members to the City's Risk Management
office. The City needs to develop a funding mechanism to pay for
claims that includes a financial incentive to the Police and Fire Bureaus
to return disabled workers to the job.
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9. While the FPD&R system is in existence, a performance audit should
be conducted at regular intervals not to exceed five years. As long as
the city auditor sits on the FPD&R Board of Trustees and supervises
the fund administrator, this audit should be conducted by an independent agent.

Policy Development and Voter Education
10. The city's elected officials should vigorously engage in a privately
funded voter education campaign prior to any election in which the
conclusions and recommendations of this report, either in whole or in
part, are included on the ballot.
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11. City Club of Portland should take a leadership role in convening
and educating community leaders, the media, unions and other stakeholders, and other members of the public about the vital importance of
acting on the conclusions and recommendations in this report.

Transition Period
The governance issues raised by your committee and the IRC, perhaps
obviously so, are relevant only as long as FPD&R exists. If your committee's recommendations are implemented, that is, if all disability
claims are moved to the city's Office of Risk Management and new
hires are moved into OPSRP, the FPD&R Board of Trustees and staff
will be responsible only for the FPD&R pension system. As such, the
responsibilities of the FPD&R trustees would diminish considerably as
they would no longer be adjudicating disability claims. This would
largely mitigate concerns about accountability and conflict of interest
on the FPD&R Board of Trustees.
Because the pension plan represents the largest share of FPD&R's liability, your committee recommends having an elected official on the
board of trustees overseeing the use of public resources. When the last
beneficiary of the closed group leaves the system (in approximately 30
years), FPD&R would likely cease to exist entirely.
Respectfully submitted,
Mary Jane Aman
Dave Dyk
Peter Farrelly
John Horvick
Susan Kelly
Paul Millius
Elia Popovich
Tatiana Terdal
Donald Williams
Christopher Woo
Eva Schweber, chair
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX B: WITNESS LIST

Assessed Value: The taxable value
established for each property by
the local assessing jurisdiction.
(See Real Market Value.)
Arbitrage: The practice of taking
advantage of an imbalance
between two or more markets.
A combination of matching deals
are struck that exploit the imbalance, the difference between the
market prices being profit.
Compression: The process of reducing property tax levies so that the
total tax assessed by local governments complies with the $10 per
$1,000 of assessed value limit
established by Measure 5.
Entry Age Actuarial Cost Method:
Converts normal costs into a percentage of an individual's salary
at entry into the system. This
allows for a percentage calculation, rather than a dollar amount,
when determining the amount to
be paid into a pension system to
cover the costs of that employee's
retirement benefits.
Floating Levy: Property tax levy
with a rate that is determined
annually. In the case of FPD&R,
the board provides City Council
with the amount of the annual liability of the system and City
Council authorizes the FPD&R
levy at a rate that will fund that
liability.
Millage Levy: Property tax levy that
is defined in mills per dollar. A
mill is one one-thousandth (.001)
of a dollar.
Normal Costs: Costs based on the
assumption that a portion of an
employee's salary is invested
annually, and that amount plus
the investment returns will cover

Drew Barden, Economist, City of Portland
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the cost of the employee's retirement benefit.
Real Market Value: The cash amount
that an informed buyer could reasonably be expected to pay an
informed seller in an arm's length
transaction on the assessment
date for the tax year. (See
Assessed Value.)
Replacement Ratio: The percentage
of an employee's salary needed to
maintain the same standard of living after retirement. Replacement
ratio is calculated by dividing the
pension benefit by the final gross
wage.
Serial Levy: A property tax levy that
is set at a fixed rate per $1,000.
A serial levy’s rate is established
prior to the authorization of the
levy and does not change
annually.
Subrogation: The right of an insurer
(who has paid the disabled person benefits) to pursue the disabled person's claim against the
person who caused the disability,
for the purpose of reimbursing
the insurer. Subrogation also may
include rights to proceed against
not just the person who caused
injury, but also any other insurer
or entity who may be liable to the
injured person. Example: FPD&R
paid a disability claim for a firefighter or police officer injured in
an automobile accident while on
the job. If the injured employee
also collected damages from an
insurance company, with subrogation rights, FPD&R could be reimbursed either by the employee
who had been twice compensated
for the same injury or directly
from the insurance company.
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Steve Manton, Pension Systems Manager, City of Portland
Robert McCrory, EFI, Actuarial Contractor to FPD&R
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Charles Rosenthal, Citizen member of FPD&R Board of Trustees
Kenneth Rust, Chief Financial Officer, City of Portland
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APPENDIX D: CITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION No. SUBSTITUTE 36287
Create an independent Citizen Review Committee to oversee a
comprehensive analysis of the Portland Fire and Police Disability
and Retirement (FPD&R) system.
WHEREAS, the City Council is committed to working collaboratively
with all stakeholders in analyzing and recommending changes to
the FPD&R system; and
WHEREAS, the City Council is committed to creating a process for
analyzing FPD&R that is free from any real or perceived bias; and
WHEREAS, the City is committed to employing and training diverse,
highly qualified, extremely effective people in its Police and Fire
Bureaus; and
WHEREAS, the City understands the unique and often dangerous circumstances that the requirements of these jobs place Police Officers
and Fire Fighters [sic] in; and
WHEREAS, the City must maintain a strong, fiscally sound retirement
and disability system to uphold our commitment to Police and Fire
employees and retirees and their families; and
WHEREAS, the City Council has an obligation to the taxpayers of the
City of Portland to be a responsible steward of the public's
resources; and
WHEREAS, each year the City must levy a significant amount of property tax dollars from its citizens to pay for that year's FPD&R pension obligations; and
WHEREAS, concerns have been raised about the disability system
administered by the FPD&R Board of Trustees; and
WHEREAS, concerns have been raised about the impact of not prefunding the retirement benefits of Portland firefighters and police
officers.
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NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that City Council directs the
creation of an independent nine-person citizen review committee
(“Independent Committee”), whose membership will be approved
by a separate resolution brought by the Mayor to Council on
February 9, 2005, to oversee a comprehensive analysis of the FPD&R
system; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the subject matter of the
Independent Committee's report to council shall include:
1) An independent analysis of the actuarial projections relied on by the
FPD&R Board;
2) An assessment of potential options for fully or partially pre-funding
the pension portion of the FPD&R system;
3) An assessment of the possibility and effects of placing new hires in
PERS, workers' compensation and Social Security;
4) A comparison of FPD&R's pension and disability costs with PERS,
workers' compensation and Social Security, including Portland
PERS firefighters and police officers, as well as with other comparable public safety systems;
5) A detailed analysis of FPD&R's disability costs, including but not
limited to, case management; doctor review, periodic review of the
long-term disabled, subrogation and an assessment of the actual
and potential impact of limited duty positions in the Bureaus,
including the impact on FPD&R disability costs of the decision by
Council to eliminate light duty positions within the Fire and Police
Bureaus;
6) An assessment of the impact that having Portland's public safety
employees on an independent system has on recruitment and retention of public safety employees;
7) An assessment of legal and other issues pertinent to the analysis
mentioned above;
8) A determination regarding which, if any, of the potential changes to
FPD&R identified by the Independent Committee would require a
vote of the people to change the City's Charter.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Independent Committee will be
assisted in its assessment by a FPD&R Technical Committee, comprised of an equal number of Office of Management and Finance
and FPD&R staff. Initially each office shall provide 3 staff members
to support the Independent Committee. Should additional staff support be needed, it shall be supplied equally by the Office of
Management and Finance and FPD&R. The Technical Committee
will also consist of members of the City Attorney's Office to assist in
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answering questions regarding the City's Charter and any legal
issues relating to the relationship between the FPD&R fund and the
City. Specific legal questions regarding disability and pension issues
will be handled by outside counsel hired by the Independent
Committee; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that all costs associated with the
Independent Committee, including contracting with an independent
actuary, disability consultant, legal consultant and/or retirement
consultant, will be funded by the Office of Management and
Finance and the FPD&R Board of Trustees. However should either
party decide to cease, or limit, their funding for any reason, the
other party can fully fund the study; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, the Independent Committee shall direct
the work of the FPD&R Technical Committee as well as any consultants that the Independent Committee decides that it needs to assist
it in its analysis; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Independent Committee will
report back to City Council no later than January 1st, 2006. If the
Independent Committee can not reach a consensus, then there shall
be a majority report and a minority report.

Adopted by the Council: January 26, 2005
GARY BLACKMER
Auditor of the City of Portland
Mayor Potter, Commissioners
Adams, Leonard, Saltzman and Sten
Prepared by: Jeff Cogen
January 24, 2005

By /S/ Colleen Phillips
Deputy
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